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Tom Regan, All That Dwell Therein: Essays on Animal Rights and
Environmental Ethics (Berkeley: University of California Press,1982)�
Press,1982)
{A Second Opinion}
This is a book of ten essays, more
than half previously published in phi
phi
losophy journals, but it nevertheless
forms a coherent whole and pays
reading straight through. Each essay
is preceded by an introduction written
for this volume, which helpfully places
the essay in context and cites articles
critical of it· that have been pub
pub
lished.
Professor
Regan
is
an
extremely precise and lucid writer.
He describes his style in one essay as
"G. E. Moorish," and this description
may to some extent be applied to all
the book's most significant philosophi
philosophi
cal essays. Some of the other essays,
which were written for lay audiences,
are lighter, and one is even moving in
its description of
specific animal
abuses.

Professor Regan's aim in these
essays is to establish the concept of
animal rights as the basis of our moral
obligation not to inflict unnecessary
suffering and death upon animals. He
argues that utilitarianism is inadequate
for this purpose because it on occa
occa
sion permits treatment of animals that
violates our intuitive notions of moral
moral
ity. Essentially, this is because utili
utili
tarianism allows suffering and death to
be inflicted on animals whenever the
resulting benefits even slightly out
out
weigh the suffering and death. The
concept of animal rights, on the other
hand, Regan argues, would preclude
the infliction of suffering and death
on animals except possibly when the
resulting benefits vastly outweigh the
harm.
In addition, the calculations
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by utilitarianism are often
if not impossible, to make.

Regan's essential thesis is that it
is reasonable to believe that all
humans have certain natural rights,
and that, if they do, the grounds
upon wh ich they do entail that at
least some animals also· have these
rights.
(The term
"all
humans"
should be understood to exclude those
. who
are
irreversibly
comatose.)
Regan employs (and refines) the so
called argument from marginal cases,
marginal cases being severely retarded
and other "non-paradigmatic" human
beings.
The argument essentially is
that if all humans have certain natural
rights, these must stem from some
thing in the nature of all humans.
Qualities such as rationality and lan
guage are not possessed by all
humans, so cannot serve as a basis
for natural rights for all humans.
Other qualities, such as having inter
ests and having intrinsic worth, are
possessed by all humans, so may fu r
nish a foundation for human rights.
Now, although animals generally do
not have rationality and language,
they generally do have interests and
intrinsic worth. Therefore, the qual
ities adequate to furnish a basis for
natu ral rights for humans also estab
lish the same natural rights for ani
mals.
In short, there are no morally rel
evant differences between the severely
retarded
and animals.
This,
of
cou rse, leaves us the option to treat
the severely retarded the way we
currently treat animals (eat them,
shoot them for sport, etc.), but
Regan is counting on our not embrac
ing this option.
Regan's case for animal rights is
presented primarily in two of the
essays in this book, "The Moral Basis
of Vegetarianism," and "An Examina
tion and Defense of One Argument

Concerning Animal Rights."
In the
fi rst essay, which was written earlier,
Regan argues that meat-eati ng is
wrong because it ordinarily results in
the violation of two natural rights
that, if possessed by all humans, are
also possessed by at least some ani
mals.
The fi rst is the equal natu ral
right to be spared undeserved pain,
which derives from the fact that all
humans and at least some animals have
interests.
The second is the equal
natural right to life, which derives
from the fact that all humans and at
least some animals
have intrinsic
worth.
Thus, Regan argues, if we
agree that, based on their having
interests, all humans have a right to
be spared. undeserved pain, then we
must agree that at least some animals,
since they also have interests, have
the same right. Similarly, if we agree
that, based on thei r intri nsic worth,
all humans have a right to life, then
we must grant the same right to ani
mals with intrinsic worth.
I n the later essay, "An Examination
and Defense of One Argument Con
cerning Animal Rights," Regan drops
the qualities of having interests and
instrinsic worth as a basis for rights
and relies solely upon the quality of
having inherent value. He also does
not specify the particular rights that
derive from having inherent value,
except to say that they are basic
moral rights.
He does,
however,
suggest that one may be the right not
to be made to suffer gratuitously.
Presumably another may be the right
to life, and, since the right not to be
made to suffer gratuitously sounds the·
same as the right to be spa red unde
served suffering,
it appears that
Regan probably still accepts the two
rights for. which he argued in the
first essay. He has, however, altered
their foundation, to which we will
return later.
In summary, the natu
ral rights Regan asserts and thei r
foundations appear to be as follows:
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"An Examination and
Defense of One
Argument Concerning
Animal Rights"
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FOUNDATION

RIGHT

to be spared undeserved suffering

having interests

to life

intrinsic worth

basic moral rights

inherent value

Peter Singer, in Animal Liberation
and in Practical Ethics, also relied
upon the argument from marginal
cases, but, as a utilitarian, he did
not posit rights.
Rather, he argued
that all sentient humans and animals,
on the basis of their sentience, are
entitled
to
have
thei r
interests
weighed equally when one determines
the morality of an act that affects
them.
Why doesn't Regan use senti
ence, instead of the more complicated
notions of having interests, instrinsic
worth, and inherent value, to estab
lish animal rights? I n the case of the
right to life, sentience clearly does
not supply an adequate basis because
life can be taken· painlessly. Singer
in fact concedes that meat-eati ng is
not immoral under some circumstances
if an animal is permitted to live a
normal life and is killed painlessly.
I n the case of the right to be
spared undeserved suffering (or not
to be made to suffer gratuitously), it
seems that sentience might suffice as
a foundation. But here we must first
consider Regan's use of the concepts
he prefers:
"interests," "intrinsic
worth," and "inherent value."
In
"The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism,"
Regan defines interests to include
such items as "liking-disliking, lov
ing-hating, hoping-fearing, desiring
avoiding" (p. 14). Here Regan seems

to be on shaky ground. He is lump
ing together states of mind of varying
levels of sophistication, and it is con
troversial which ones animals possess.
Animals' rights, it is hoped, do not
depend on the extent to which animals
have the states of mind that Regan
defines as constituting "interests."
Of course, Regan could reduce these
states of mind to forms of feeling
pleasu re and pain ~ but then he would
be equating "having interests" with
sentience.
Regan, however, appar
ently does not co.nsider sentience an
adequate foundation for the right to
be
spared
undeserved
suffering.
Perhaps this is because he wants to
avoid saying that an imals have a right
to be spared undeserved pain because
it is undeserved and painful.
But
this seems the only alternative unless
he is prepared to prove that animals
have relative sophisticated states of
consciousness.
As for the foundation, in "The
Moral Basis of Vegetarianism," of the
right to life, Regan identifies the
notion of "intrinsic worth" with exist
ing as an end in oneself. A person is
an end in himself if he has "various
positive interests, such as desires,
goals, hopes, preferences and the
like" (p. 30).
The right to life
derives from the fact that these inter
ests can not be satisfied if one is
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dead.
Here again Regan· is lumping
varying
states
of
consciousness
together, and the degree to which
animals have these states seems quite
controversial.
BLjt, here, reducing
these states of mi nd to sentience
clearly will not do, because the right
Regan is attempting to derive from
"intrinsic worth" is the right to life,
and lives, as noted, can be taken
without
the
victims'
suffering.
Therefore,
it appears that unless
Regan can prove that animals have
relatively soph isticated states of con
consciousness, he has not shown that
. animals have a right to life.
I n "An Examination and Defense of
One
Argument
Concerning
Animal
Rights," Regan derives basic moral
rights from inherent value.
For an
individual to have inherent value, he
says, is to have value logically inde
independent of any other being's happen
happening to take an interest in or otherwise
valuing the individual.
An individu
individual's inherent value,
Regan claims,
does not stem from sentience or from
having interests; rather,
it stems
from the fact that certain forms of life
are better or worse for the individual
whose life it it, as opposed to anyone
else. Regan suggests that all humans
who a re not irreversibly comatose
have Iives that can be. better or worse
for them, and therefore have inherent
value.
If this is the case, then the
argument from marginal cases proves
that at least some an imais also have
inherent value.
A problem with this line of reason
reasoning is that to say that an individual
has a life that is better or worse for
the particular individual seems to be
reducible to saying that the individual

is sentient.
To say that a non-sen
non-sentient being, such as a plant or an
irreversibly comatose human, has a
i ife that can be better or worse for
itself, would be to remove all meaning
from the words "for itself."
All a
plant
has
IS
a
life,
and
what
distinguishes it from a being that
might be said to have a life for itself
is that the plant lacks sentience. We
therefore are in the same position with
"inherent value" as we were with
"having
interests"
and
"intrinsic
worth." The only state of mind that
no reasonable person can deny that
most animals have is sentience, and it
is difficult, Regan believes, to estab- .
lish rights based on sentience.
It is difficult to establish rights
based on sentience, but it is also dif
difficult to establish rights based on
qualities that only humans, or prima
primarily humans,
possess.
Therefore,
whether,
if humans
have natural
rights, then animals have them, may
be a moot question. Establishing ani
animals' rights, however, wou Id be very
desirable,
because of the serious
problems with utilitarianism, both in
its application and results.
It is
therefore not intended to denigrate
Regan's efforts by noting some of the
problems in his attempts to establish
an imais' rights.
Th is book u ndoub
ndoubtedly represents the most sign ificant
sustained attempt that has occured,
and if it has not completely suc
succeeded, this may be because its goal
At the very least it
is unattainable.
should provide a valuable focal point
for future consideration of the sub':'
ject, and should take its place along
alongside Peter Singer's works as the most
important and original in the field.
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